Eight years later after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our approach to port security still seems to be guided by a strategy of Ready! Shoot! Aim!

Too many people still believe we can secure our nation’s borders – in particular, prevent an attack with a weapon of mass destruction – if we inspect 100% of all ocean containers that enter the U.S.

We’re asking the wrong question. 100% inspection is a flawed premise. It ignores common-sense logic, is short on risk analysis, would be a logistics and economic nightmare, and in the end, does not solve the problem.

In fact, not only will a strategy of 100% screening not improve our security, it will make us more vulnerable, because the money could have been spent on programs with a far better return on investment.

The modern-day terrorist is a thinking enemy who is patient, uses extensive surveillance and carefully selects the means and methods of attack.  This enemy is not concerned about port container inspection. Why?  Because many of the weapons they would choose to accomplish their mission -- chemical, biological, radiological or enhanced conventional explosives – are already here!

According to an EPA document which was removed from the Internet shortly after 9/11, there are at least 123 chemical facilities in the U.S. that could put a million people at risk if attacked, and more than 700 other industrial plants that could put at least 100,000 people at risk.

A study in the late 1990s conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency revealed that the equipment required to build a sophisticated biological weapon could be purchased off the Internet for less than $50,000, and would fit inside a standard two-car garage.

Why bring radiological material into the U.S. to attack us? It's already here. The material required to build a "dirty bomb" is readily available at medical facilities, research institutes, universities and major construction sites. Trucks containing large quantities of cesium-137 drive between hospitals in Southern California every day with no security protection.

As for enhanced conventional weapons, future terrorists will have no more problem building them inside the U.S. than did Ramzi Yousef, who built the bomb that exploded under the World Trade Center in 1993.

In other words, a 100% success rate for "scan before sail" or similar inspection programs will simply not reduce the likelihood of chemical, biological, radiological or enhanced conventional attacks.

What about nukes?  The best strategy for preventing a nuclear device from entering the U.S. has little to do with examining containers by X-ray machines and radiological scanners -- despite the idea's appeal to some elected officials. The formula for success is what I call "70-20-10":

• 70% of money appropriated in the name of "securing America against nuclear terrorism" should be spent "upstream": thwarting efforts to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material. This includes increased funding for programs such as Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, and ensuring that our intelligence community places as its highest priority locating and interdicting “stray” nuclear devices
• 20% of funding should be allocated to the pursuit and recovery of material and devices should weapons-grade materials fall into terrorists' hands. This should be a multinational effort led by the U.S.
• 10% should be spent on response and mitigation capabilities should a nuclear detonation occur.

Source: www.whitehouse.gov

Congressional leaders who are calling for 100% inspection are asking the wrong question: “How do we prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destruction through one of our ports?”  It’s the same question Congress posed over 60 years ago to Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, the “father of the atomic bomb.” When asked in 1947 how the country could prevent the Soviets from sneaking a nuclear weapon into the U.S. through our seaports.  Dr. Oppenheimer responded, “Buy lots of screwdrivers. You will need to open every crate that enters America.”

Sixty years later, Congress still wants to "look" inside every container. Don't they understand, Dr. Oppenheimer was joking!

Colonel Randall J. Larsen, USAF (Ret) is the Executive Director of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism and the author of, OUR OWN WORST ENEMY: Asking the Questions About Security for You, Your Family and America (Grand Central, 2007). He formerly served as the Chairman, Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College, where in 1999, he created the nation’s first graduate course in homeland security.

Source: www.whitehouse.gov

The 9/11 Act passed by Congress in 2007 included the requirement to scan 100% of U.S. inbound containerized cargo. In the years since the law passed, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, the Department of Homeland Security and the international community have spoken out loudly in opposition to the mandate and the impact it would have on global trade, economic recovery and the negative effects on security. Despite this vocal opposition and the universal opinion that CBP will not meet the 2012 deadline, Congress keeps the mandate in place.

I believe recent comments by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce capture the heart of the argument. These provide a realistic baseline for moving forward with a reasonable approach to global security:

“A policy of blanket inspection misdirects limited resources away from programs with the greatest security benefits and places an unnecessary burden on the global supply chain. Since the passage of the 9/11 Act in 2007, it has become evident, as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reported, that the 100 percent mandate is impracticable and abandons the effectiveness of the multilayered risk based approach. Beyond the direct costs of implementation, the hidden costs contribute to greater supply chain delays and increased trade barriers. In light of the operational shortcomings of this mandate, keeping the law in place sends a confusing message to the international community and threatens U.S. credibility toward developing a viable trade security program.”

Primary concerns over this mandate, outlined below, have been shared with Congress by current and past leadership at DHS, the Governmental Accountability Office, and the international community. These concerns include:

• significant technical and affordability challenges with current technology;
• insufficient infrastructure at foreign ports;
• threat of reciprocity by the international community;
• strong opposition from U.S. trading partners;
• focusing the limited resources of Customs on an ineffective program;
• security that is actually diminished, not enhanced, and;
• substantial impact on global trade and economic recovery.

The United States should reach out to its trading partners to develop a comprehensive, multilateral supply chain security program that promotes trade and security on both sides of the transaction. We can accomplish these goals by furthering discussions on the WCO SAFE Framework and moving forward on mutual recognition.

The end game for business and government is to come up with a harmonized approach that both enhances the security of global supply chain operations and facilitates legitimate trade. Congress should end this unworkable mandate, and show the international community that they are serious about making real progress on this issue.